Eduardo S. Garza v. Tamara Holden : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Eduardo S. Garza v. Tamara Holden : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Angela F. Micklos; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Eduardo S. Garza; Pro Se.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Garza v. Holden, No. 920622 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3586
TV*,!- i 
OOJMENT 
FU 
10 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DGKET MO. J&^A^L 
EDUARDO S. GARZA, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
Case No. 920622-CA 
Priority No. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF A PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, 
PRESIDING. 
EDUARDO S. GARZA 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Pro Se 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525 
(801) 575-1600 
Attorneys for Appellee 
FILED 
Utah Court ot Appeals 
MAR \ 5 1993 
J. Maryl.N'Xjnan 
J Clerk of the Court Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EDUARDO S. GARZA, : 
Petitioner-Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 920622-CA 
TAMARA HOLDEN, : 
Priority No. 3 
Respondent-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF A PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, 
PRESIDING. 
EDUARDO S. GARZA JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
P.O. Box 250 Utah Attorney General 
Draper, Utah 84020 ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525 
(801) 575-1600 
Pro Se Attorneys for Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS . . . . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
PETITION BECAUSE PETITIONER'S CLAIMS COULD 
AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL 
POINT II THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE 
PETITION AS FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS 
WERE CONTRADICTED BY THE RECORD . . . . 
CONCLUSION 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) . . . 5, 6 
Gerrish v. Barnes. 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 7f 9 (Utah Dec. 16, 
1992) 2, 6 
Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons. 806 P.2d 217 . . . . 2 
(Utah App. 1991) 
Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52 (1985) 8, 9 
10, 11 
Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) 5 
Medina v. Cook. 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989) 11 
State v. Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989) . . . U 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) . . . . 8 
Waastaff v. Barnes. 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990) . . . 2, 5 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992) 2, 3 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) 7 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EDUARDO S. GARZA, : 
Petitioner-Appellant, * 
v. : Case No. 920622-CA 
TAMARA HOLDEN, : 
Priority No. 3 
Respondent-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. This court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(g) 
(Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This case involves the summary dismissal of a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. The issues raised on appeal are: 
1. Did the district court properly find that petitioner 
waived consideration of his claims by failing to raise them on 
direct appeal? 
2. Did the district court correctly determine that 
petitioner's claims were frivolous because they were contrary to 
the record of petitioner's criminal proceedings? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a habeas corpus 
petition, the court examines the record "in the light most 
favorable to the findings and judgment . . . and will not reverse 
if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the trial 
court's denial of the writ." Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons, 806 
P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). See also Waastaff 
v. Barnes. 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah App. 1990). 
However, no deference is accorded the lower court's 
conclusions of law underlying the dismissal of the petition. 
Rather, the court reviews such determinations for correctness. 
Gerrish v. Barnes, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah Dec. 16, 1992) 
(citing Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)) 
(citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a second degree 
felony on August 18, 1989 (R. 8). Petitioner signed a plea 
affidavit, admitting that he consumed alcohol and operated a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol level greater than .08 
(Addendum F at 2). Petitioner also stated that he understood that 
any sentencing recommendation made by either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor was not binding upon the judge (Addendum F at 4, I 14). 
2 
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On September 27, 1989, petitioner's counsel filed a motion to 
sentence petitioner to a felony one degree lower than the crime of 
conviction (Addendum A). Petitioner's counsel based his motion on 
the fact that petitioner had been taking heart medication which 
interacted with the alcohol he consumed, causing him to be 
involuntarily intoxicated and disoriented (Addendum B). The 
prosecutor did not contest petitioner's motion (Addendum A). 
On September 29, 1989, the Honorable David S. Young sentenced 
petitioner to serve a term of one-to-fifteen years at the Utah 
State Prison (R. 8). On June 24, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea (Addendum C). It is unclear whether 
petitioner abandoned his motion or whether the court denied it, as 
the record is devoid of either a minute entry or an order 
pertaining to petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea. 
Petitioner did not appeal either his conviction or, assuming his 
motion was denied, the court's denial of his motion to withdraw his 
plea (R. 5, I 4; Addendum D). 
On June 5, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus and post-conviction relief (R. 2; Addendum D). 
Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
allegedly: 1) spending too little time with petitioner; 2) 
suggesting that petitioner plead guilty, after telling petitioner 
the State could not prove intent; 3) failing to obtain an affidavit 
from petitioner's doctor, David Boorman; 4) failing to request a 
continuance to obtain Dr. Boorman's affidavit; and 5) failing to 
withdraw petitioner's guilty plea (R. 3-4; Addendum D). 
3 
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The petition was originally assigned to the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, but was transferred to the Honorable David S. Young on 
August 10, 1992 (R. 23-24). On September 3, 1992, the district 
court dismissed the petition on the grounds that: 1) the issues in 
the petition could and should have been raised on direct appeal; 
and 2) petitioner's allegations were contrary to the record (R. 25; 
Addendum E). Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on September 
24, 1992 (R. 26). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A statement of facts beyond those set forth in the above 
Statement of the Case is not necessary to resolve the issues 
presented on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court properly dismissed the petition for writ of 
habeas corpus because all of petitioner's claims could and should 
have been raised on direct appeal. Furthermore, the court reviewed 
the file from petitioner's criminal proceedings and correctly 
determined that petitioner's allegations were contrary to the 
record evidence. For these reasons, the court properly dismissed 
the petition as frivolous. 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
PETITION BECAUSE PETITIONER'S CLAIMS 
COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON 
APPEAL. 
A writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for direct appeal 
and cannot be used to fulfill the purpose of regular appellate 
review. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983). See also 
Waastaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990); Hurst v. Cook, 
777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989). The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
It is therefore well settled in this state 
that allegations of error that could have been 
but were not raised on appeal from a criminal 
conviction cannot be raised by habeas corpus 
or postconviction review, except in unusual 
circumstances. 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1104. The court further noted that habeas 
corpus may be invoked 
only when the court had no jurisdiction over 
the person or the offense, or where the 
requirements of law have been so disregarded 
that the party is substantially and 
effectively denied due process of law, or 
where some such fact is shown that it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine the 
conviction. 
Id. at 1105 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). If the alleged 
error is known or should have been known to the petitioner at the 
time judgment was entered, 
it must be reviewed in the manner and within 
the time permitted by regular prescribed 
procedure, or the judgment becomes final and 
is not subject to further attack, except in 
some such unusual circumstance as we have 
mentioned above. Were it otherwise, the 
regular rules of procedure governing appeals 
5 
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and the limitations of time specified therein 
would be rendered impotent. 
Id., (citations omitted). Accord Gerrish v. Barnes, 202 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7, 9 (Utah Dec. 16, 1992). 
Since all of petitioner's claims relate to the effectiveness 
of counsel before and during the plea proceedings, petitioner must 
have been or at least should have been aware of counsel's alleged 
ineffectiveness by the time he was sentenced. Therefore, 
petitioner should have raised his claims on direct appeal. 
Petitioner claims he did not appeal because "plea bargains are not 
appealable," however, he is mistaken (R. 5; Addendum D). 
Petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty plea in June of 1991 
(Addendum C). In his motion to withdraw his plea, petitioner 
raised essentially the same claims of ineffectiveness that form the 
basis of his petition (Addenda C & D; R. 3-4). Therefore, 
petitioner was aware of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness at 
the time he moved to withdraw his plea. Assuming the court denied 
his motion to withdraw his plea, petitioner could have appealed. 
Petitioner's failure to appeal procedurally bars him from raising 
the claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus or other post-
conviction relief. 
Even if petitioner abandoned his motion to withdraw his plea, 
his claims are procedurally barred. Petitioner's failure to pursue 
direct remedies does not render his claims appropriate for 
collateral review. Furthermore, petitioner has not demonstrated 
unusual circumstances warranting consideration of these issues for 
6 
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habeas review. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed 
the petition. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
THE PETITION AS FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE THE 
ALLEGATIONS WERE CONTRADICTED BY THE 
RECORD. 
In dismissing the petition, the district court ruled that 
petitioner's claims of ineffective counsel were contradicted by the 
record (R. 25; Addendum E). Although the court did not 
specifically state that petitioner's claims were frivolous, two 
factors demonstrate that the court actually dismissed the petition 
on that basis. First, the court noted that the issue of 
ineffective counsel is normally one that would require a hearing, 
but, thereafter, stated that the record offered no support for 
petitioners's claims (R. 25; Addendum E). Second, the court never 
ordered the Attorney General's office to file a response. Rule 
65B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the court to 
order a response unless the petition is dismissed as frivolous on 
its face. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (7)-(8). Since no response was 
ordered, the court effectually dismissed the petition as frivolous 
on its face. 
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner claims 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly 1) spending 
too little time with petitioner; 2) suggesting that petitioner 
plead guilty, after telling petitioner the State could not prove 
intent; 3) failing to obtain an affidavit from petitioner's doctor, 
7 
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David Boorman; 4) failing to request a continuance to obtain Dr. 
Boorman's affidavit; and 5) failing to withdraw petitioner's guilty 
plea (R. 3-4; Addendum D). 
Essentially, petitioner is claiming that his counsel was 
ineffective at sentencing, for failing to obtain an affidavit of 
Dr. Boorman. In order to determine whether counsel's advice 
constitutes ineffective assistance, it is necessary to apply the 
two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the two-part Strickland standard applies to 
"challenges to guilty pleas based upon ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Therefore, "[w]hen a convicted 
defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, 
the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id., at 57 (citations 
omitted). Additionally, "[t]he defendant must show that there is 
a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Id. The foregoing prejudice requirement is based on the Court's 
conclusion that "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally 
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a 
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." 
Id. 
The Supreme Court clarified the requirements of the prejudice 
prong with respect to allegations of ineffectiveness during the 
plea process, stating that in order to satisfy the prejudice prong, 
8 
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the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial." JId. at 59 (emphasis 
added). The purpose of requiring a demonstration of prejudice 
from petitioners who challenge the validity of their guilty pleas 
on the ground of ineffective counsel, is to maintain the 
"fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas." JEd. at 58. 
After reviewing the record from petitioner's criminal 
proceedings, the district court correctly determined that the 
petition was frivolous because it was directly contradicted by the 
record (R. 25; Addendum E). Essentially, petitioner's claims of 
ineffectiveness are based on petitioner's belief that he was 
sentenced for a second degree felony only because the district 
court did not have Dr. Boorman's affidavit concerning petitioner's 
prescription drugs. Petitioner alleges that if the court had been 
aware of the drug-alcohol interaction, that he would only have been 
sentenced for a third degree felony a term of 0-5 years (See 
Addendum D). 
However, the record demonstrates that counsel was well aware 
of petitioner's heart attack and the prescription medications 
petitioner was taking when the crime occurred, and that counsel 
conveyed that information to the district court (Addendum B, 2-3). 
Although the court did not have an affidavit from Dr. Boorman, the 
court was informed of petitioner's medical condition through 
counsel's memorandum in support of sentencing petitioner to a third 
degree felony (Addendum B). Petitioner's counsel stated Dr. 
9 
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Boorman's position in his memorandum, with no opposition from the 
prosecutor. Since the facts concerning petitioner's condition and 
Dr. Boorman's opinion concerning the impact of any prescription 
medicines were undisputed, there was no need to obtain a separate 
affidavit from Dr. Boorman. The trial court was fully aware of Dr. 
Boorman's position, and therefore, petitioner was not prejudiced by 
the lack of an affidavit. 
Additionally, petitioner acknowledged that in addition to the 
ingestion of prescription drugs, he had consumed approximately one 
six-pack of beer (Addendum B at 3). Petitioner did not dispute 
that at the time he drove, his blood alcohol level was .16, twice 
the legal limit (Addendum B at 2). Additionally, petitioner 
admitted that he "consumed alcohol to such a degree that it 
rendered [him] . . . incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle" 
(Addendum F at 2). Despite defense counsel's assertion that 
petitioner's intoxication was involuntary, there was ample evidence 
to support a conclusion that petitioner was voluntarily 
intoxicated. Therefore, counsel's advice that petitioner plead 
guilty, based on these facts, was "within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 474 U.S. at 56. 
Petitioner must also show that absent counsel's shortcomings, 
petitioner would not have pled guilty, however, the petition lacks 
any allegation of prejudice (R. 2-11; Addendum D). Moreover, the 
record demonstrates that petitioner was not prejudiced by the 
alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance. Petitioner signed 
a plea affidavit, indicating that his plea of guilty was a knowing, 
10 
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voluntary, and intelligent choice (Addendum F). By signing the 
affidavit, petitioner also admitted that he understood that any 
sentencing recommendation made by either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor, was not binding on the judge (Addendum F at 4). 
Therefore, even if counsel provided the court with Dr. Boorman's 
affidavit, the court was not bound to follow counsel's sentencing 
recommendation (Addendum F at 4). See also. State v. Thurston. 781 
P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989) (sentencing recommendations are not 
binding upon the court). 
The foregoing demonstrates that petitioner failed to meet 
the Strickland-Hill standard of ineffectiveness. Accordingly, this 
Court should uphold the district court's ruling. See Medina v. 
Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989) (petition for habeas corpus properly 
dismissed where ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not 
supported by the record); See also Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 (district 
court did not err in declining to hold a hearing on ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim where petitioner failed to allege 
necessary prejudice). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this court should affirm the district 
court's dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief. 
Petitioner could and should have raised his claims on appeal. 
Furthermore, petitioner's allegations were contradicted by the 
record. 
WHEREFORE, the court should affirm the dismissal of the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
11 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this l5> day of March, 1993. 
ANGELA^F. MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
-c£_ l.-ytsp&M 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
day of March, 1993 to: 
Eduardo S. Garza 
Appellant Pro Se 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
«f..%nn/UcUaA 
^.-TVUcbe^ 
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JAMES I. WATTS #4768 
Attorney for Defendant 
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
EDUARDO GARZA 
Defendant. 
i MOTION 
1 Case No. ^ 1 ^ 0 ( 0 3 5 
COMES NOW Defendant, Eduardo Garza, by and through his 
attorney of record, James I. Watts, and pursuant to stipulation 
with the Salt Lake County Attorneyfs Office, submits this Motion 
pursuant to §77-35-12, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure and does 
request that the Defendant be sentenced pursuant to §76-3-402 of 
the Utah Criminal Code to the next lower degree charged, doing so 
for the reasons contained in the Memorandum and Affidavit filed 
in support of this Motion. 
DATED this ^7 ~ day of September 
o 
P , S T
« / C T COURT 
J
-^rrciE{>K 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Motion was hand delivered to Scott W. Reed, 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney at 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 on this P i day of September, 1989. 
\/D/yt.. CUH ^J> * ik*y C-SECRETARY/ 
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JAMES I. WATTS #4768 
Attorney for Defendant 
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDUARDO GARZA 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Defendant in the above-entitled matter and does 
herewith submit this Memorandum to the Court in support of his 
Motion for sentencing pursuant to §76-3-402 of the Utah Criminal 
Code. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, a 45 year old individual was charged with 
criminal homicide, vehicle homicide, in violation of §76-5-
207(2) of the Utah Criminal Code, a Second Degree Felony. The 
events giving rise to the charge was an automobile accident which 
occurred on or about May 10, 1989, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, involving vehicles operated by the Defendant and one David 
Crofts. That the accident occurred on 1-215 and was a result of 
^STRICT COURT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION 
Case NO. nvo/ebs 
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o 
the Defendant who had been travelling northbound executing a U-
turn in the northbound lanes and began travelling south in the 
northbound lanes which resulted in a head-on collision with Mr. 
Crofts, and as a result of that accident, Mr. Crofts was killed. 
That as a result of the impact, Defendant was thrown from 
his vehicle, sustaining head and leg injuries and rendered 
unconscious. He was subsequently transported by ambulance to 
L.D.S. Hospital where he received medical treatment for his 
injuries and a technician drew blood for purposes of chemical 
analysis. That the chemical analysis performed by the L.D.S. 
Hospital resulted in a determination that the Defendant's blood 
alcohol content was .16 by weight, and that further there were 
other substances in the blood stream which were not isolated as 
to origin, but according to the report, were not marijuana or 
other non-prescription drugs. That the facts further show that 
in February of 1989, the Defendant did suffer a major heart 
attack and was treated by a David C. Boorman of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake County. That 
during the hospitalization for treatment of his heart condition, 
Mr. Garza was prescribed numerous medications both to stabilize 
the heart and to reduce the pains of angina which he continues to 
suffer. 
That following his release from the hospital, he was 
2 
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r\ 
directed and required to continue to take the following 
medications as part of his ongoing post-hospitalization care: 
Tenormin, Cordizin and in those instances where there was an 
onset of extreme angina, Nitrostat. 
That on the date of the accident, Mr. Garza did at 
approximately 7:30 p.m. take the medications prescribed and did 
consume that medication with alcohol. That Mr. Garza had been 
consuming alcohol during the late afternoon and early evening 
hours, consuming approximately one six-pack of beer during the 
period of time 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. That following 
the consumption of the alcohol, Defendant did attempt to drive 
himself to his home located in West Valley City, during which 
time the accident did occur. 
ARGUMENT 
THAT INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION IS A DEFENSE TO A CHARGE OF 
WHICH AN ELEMENT IS "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE". 
That as a result of the prescribed medications, the 
Defendant was rendered involuntarily intoxicated and the charge 
against him, a Second Degree Felony, to which he has entered a 
guilty plea, should be reduced to a Third Degree Felony for 
purposes of sentencing. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-207 defines automobile homicide 
as follows: 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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'^ 
(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile 
homicide, a Second Degree Felony, if the actor 
operates a motor vehicle which while having a 
blood-alcohol content of .08 percent or greater by 
weight, or which under the influence of alcohol and 
any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug, to a degree which renders the actor 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle and causes 
the death of another by operating the vehicle in a 
criminally negligent manner. 
(b) For purposes of this subsection 
"criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as 
defined by §76-2-103(4) Utah Criminal Code. 
The relevant section of the Utah Criminal Code defines 
criminal negligence as follows: 
(a) "A person engages in conduct: (4) with 
criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct, 
or the result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that a 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's viewpoint. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that criminal 
negligence requires more than the actor1s intoxication, in the 
case of State of Utah v. McPhee, in which they stated: 
"...Intoxication is not prima facia evidence, but only a factor 
to be considered along with the other factors" (See Estate of 
Reuben, Utah 663 P.2d 445 (1983); State v. Chavez, Utah, 605 P.2d 
1226 (1979). 
4 
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When evaluating intoxication as a defense to a criminal 
charge# the Courts of this country and Utah have uniformly held 
that the actor's voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense in 
those offenses when "recklessness or criminal negligence" is an 
element of the offense. That as a result of those numerous 
holdings, the Utah Legislature in 1973 did adopt the following 
statute which is codified as UCA §76-2-306: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense 
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental state which is 
an element of the offense; however, if recklessness 
or criminal negligence establishes an element of a 
defense, and the actor is unaware of the risk of 
voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is 
immaterial of the prosecution for that offense. 
See also State v. Standford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988; State v. 
Padilla. Ill, Utah A.D. Rep. 34 June 30, 1989. 
In this instance, it is well settled that a voluntary 
intoxication would not constitute a valid defense for the crime 
as charged since criminal negligence and recklessness constitutes 
the basis upon which the charge is brought and the Utah statute 
is clear. 
As well settled as the principal of law that voluntary 
intoxication does not constitute a valid defense to a Defendant 
charged with a non-specific intend crime, is equally the 
principal that involuntary intoxication may provide a defense to 
5 
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crimes not only involving specific intent but crimes involving a 
mens rea of recklessness. This doctrine has been embraced by 
numerous states and acceptance can be found in decisions based on 
the common law as far back as the middle 1700's. Thus, in 1 Hale 
history of the Pleas of the Crown, 32 (1778) it is said: 
That if a person by the unskillfulness of his 
physician or by the contrivance of his enemies, eat 
or drink such a thing as causeth such a temporary 
or permanent phrenzy, as aconitum or nux vomica, 
this puts him into the same condition, in 
reference, to crimes, as any other phrenzy, and 
equally excuseth him. 
The principle of involuntary intoxication as a defense to 
non-specific intent crimes has been embraced in varying degrees 
by the Courts of the United States. The Arizona Supreme Court 
has adopted the position that: "Involuntary intoxication would be 
a complete defense if the Defendant was compelled to drink 
against his will and "his reason was destroyed" so "that he did 
not understand and appreciate the consequences of his acts." 
Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029 (1931). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court in the case of City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 
N.W. 2d 851, addressed and thoroughly analyzed the defense of 
involuntary intoxication and identified four distinct means by 
which a defendant could become involuntarily intoxicated. The 
last of the four methods accepted by the Court was: "When the 
Defendant is unexpectedly intoxicated due to the ingestion of a 
6 
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medically prescribed drug, if the prescribed drug is taken 
pursuant to medical advise, and without Defendant's knowledge of 
the potentially intoxicating effects." The Minnesota Court 
further reduced the scope of the application of involuntary 
intoxication, by prescribing requirements for its application as 
a defense. Those requirements for application are as follows: 
(1) That the Defendant must not know, or have 
reason to know, that the prescribed drug is likely 
to have an intoxicating effect. 
(2) That the prescribed drug is the cause of 
the intoxication. 
(3) That the defendant, due to involuntary 
intoxication, is temporarily insane. 
The Minnesota Court further defined "legally insane" pursuant to 
Minnesota statute as follows: 
...But he shall not be excused from criminal 
liability except upon proof that at the time of 
committing the alleged criminal act, he was 
laboring under such a defect of reason, from one of 
these causes, as not to know the nature of his act, 
or that it was wrong. (Minn. St. §671.026). 
The principle of involuntary intoxication to non-specific 
intent crimes is likewise embraced by the Model Penal Code, 
§2.04(4), 10 U.L.A. 473; Involuntary intoxication is an 
affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor 
at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate his criminality (wrongfulness) or to conform his 
7 
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r^ 
conduct to the requirement of the law". The defendant must have 
the capability of forming an opinion as to the reckless nature or 
the consequences of his actions if such a standard is to be 
applied. This appears to be the position of the Utah Supreme 
Court when it addressed issues of "recklessness in the case of 
State v. Standford, 269 P.2d 254, 263 (Utah 1988) in which they 
state: "...the term "recklessness" requires a conscious 
awareness of a risk is the same as "knowing that the risk 
exists"". 
Clearly# the degree of intoxication is one of the factors 
to be considered by a Court in evaluating whether the Defendant 
was reckless or criminally negligent, but intoxication in and of 
itself is not sufficient basis for such a ruling. The Utah 
Supreme Court has in numerous decisions set forth the many 
factors which may be considered in determining the degree of 
culpability with which an actor acted. Estate of Reuben, Utah, 
663 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1983); State v. Riddle, 112 Utah 356, 364, 
188 P.2d 449, 453 (1948); State v. Cook, 21 Utah 2d 36, 439 P.2d 
852 (1968). The Alabama Supreme Court held in the case of 
Johnson v. State, 32 Ala. App. 217, 24 So. 2d 228, that a 
defendant's intoxication produced by drugs, prescribed by a 
doctor and an over indulgence of whiskey constituted involuntary 
intoxication and that the combination so impaired Defendant's 
8 
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mind as to render him incapable and totally irresponsible for his 
acts. 
The Defendant's testimony, if this matter had been tried, 
would be that he had consumed approximately 6 beers over a period 
of some 2 1/2 hours during the late afternoon and early evening 
of the accident. That during the day, he does not recall having 
eaten. That at approximately 6:00 - 7:00 p.m. he took the 
medications Tenormin and Cordizin as prescribed, doing so with a 
beer. That he had not been instructed not to take the medication 
with alcohol and that no warning appeared on the drug containers. 
That following the pills, he can recall and recollect the events 
approximately one-half hour, after which time he no longer 
recalls the events of the evening, to include the accident which 
occurred some hours following his ingestion of the medication. 
That he was a periodic consumer of alcohol and is aware of 
the affects that alcohol has upon him. That in the past he has 
consumed amounts in excess of the six cans consumed this day 
without experiencing any of the problems now complained of, 
including disorientation and loss of memory. The two medications 
as prescribed according to the information contained in the 
Physicians Desk Reference on medications indicates the following: 
(1) That Cordizin is an anti-hypertension drug designed to 
regulate blood pressure through the dilation of arteries and 
9 
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veins and intended to relieve the pain associated with angina; 
(2) Tenormin is a beta blocker designed to reduce the demand for 
oxygen by the heart, through the reduction of a patient1s pulse. 
That the medical information and literature indicates that 
neither Tenormin nor Cordizin are drugs which when taken in 
combination with alcohol results in an increased potency or 
effect. The drugs in and of themselves, depending upon the 
physical condition of the patient, may result in artificially 
reducing the blood pressure and the oxygen going to the brain 
which may result in disorientation, delirium of the patient or in 
extreme cases loss of consciousness. That it is likely in this 
instance that the medications themselves were the cause of the 
disorientation and loss of cognitive capabilities which resulted 
in Mr. Garza executing a U-turn on the northbound lanes of 1-215 
and proceeding south and resulting in the accident. That he does 
not recall seeing oncoming traffic or hearing or seeing warnings 
being given by the operator of other vehicles. 
That Mr. Garza had no way of knowing that the medications 
may cause the effects now complained of so as to conform his 
behavior and to cease operating motorized vehicles during the 
time in which he was on such medication. That after taking the 
medication, the mental state of the Defendant became such that he 
did not and could not have perceived that his conduct constituted 
10 
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a substantial and unjustifiable risk to both himself and to 
others as to constitute a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise as the drug had 
rendered him incapable of making such decisions, (See the 
attached Affidavit of Dr. Boorman, who after reviewing the 
medical records and discussing this matter with the Defendant has 
developed an opinion that the medications prescribed and 
identified herein were likely the cause Mr. Garza's substantial 
disorientation). 
CONCLUSION 
That as a result of the involuntary intoxication of Mr. 
Garza, through the injunction of prescribed drugs he cannot be 
held to the standard articulated for criminal negligence as 
defined by the Utah statute, and that the Court should sentence 
him under §76-5-207(1) to a Third Degree Felony with an element 
of simple negligence. 
DATED this J) 7 *~ day of September 
11 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Memorandum was hand delivered to Scott W. 
Reed, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney at 231 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this 2 ~~) day of September, 
1989. 
S E C R E T A R Y / & 
O 
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/T n 
EDUARDO S. GARZA 
Pro Se 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Third Judicial Dfctrict 
JUN 2 ^  1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs 
EDUARDO S. GARZA 
Defendant 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY 
891-901035FS 
Judge David S. Young 
COMES NOW, the defendant, Pro Se, and pursuant to rule 11 
(e), 5, and 6, moves this court to vacate the defendant's plea of 
guilty in the above-entitled matter. This motion is based on the 
following; 
1. Defendant's counsel, James Watts, mislead the defendant 
into believing that he could secure an affidavit from the 
defendant's cardiologist, that would show the cause of the 
accident to be not entirely the fault of the defendant. 
2. Defendant's counsel told him that the affidavit, plus a 
plea of guilty would result in a plea bargin with the states 
attorney. 
3. That counsel failed to secure such affidavit, and as a 
result the state's attorney refused to comply with his part of the 
plea bargin. 
4. That defendant's counsel did not tell him of the failure 
to secure said affidavit until the moment of sentencing. 
5. That the defendant had already entered his plea when he 
found out that counsel could not complete the plea bargin. 
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n 
6. That at the time he discovered the plea bargin would not 
be maintained, the defendant was severely depressed, and was not 
in complete control of his faculties% 
7. That he was recovering from a major heart attack at the 
time of sentencing. In combination with the depression, the 
defendant did not rightfully know what he was acceeding to. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant moves this court .. allow him to 
withdraw his plea of guilty and remand this matter for trial. 
DATED this %0 Tj\, day of June 1991. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A D D E N D U M D 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^ ^ EDUARDO S. GARZA 
\ R ^ Attorney Pro Se 
\ ^ \ Utah State Prison 
1 P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDUARDO S. GARZA, * 
Petitioner, * PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
* HABEAS CORPUS AND POST 
VS. * CONVICTION RELIEF 
* 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden, * Case No. 
Respondent. * Judge ¥k(mm COMES NOW the Petitioner, EDUARDO S. GARZA, pursuant to the 
following Rule of Civil Procedure: 
X Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on original commitment, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on parole violation, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on probation violation, or 
Rule 65B(c) since claim is based on parole grant hearing, 
, and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following 
location: Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
2. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following 
Court: Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction was entered 
are as follows: September 29, 1989. 
The case number for these proceedings is: not known; _X_ known 
and is case number 891-901035 FS. 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
3. In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis 
of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as 
the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as follows: 
a. Petitioner's retained counsel was ineffective in 
representing the Petitioner for the charges which lead to 
Petitioner's incarceration. 
b. Petitioner met several times throughout his court 
appearances with his retained counsel between 5-11-89 to 9-29-89 
for approximately 10-15 minutes each time. However, when 
petitioner went before the court for sentencing counsel talked to 
the petitioner less them 5 minutes. 
c. Petitioner's counsel assured the petitioner that 
there was no way that the petitioner could be convicted of the 
crime the petitioner was charged with. Counsel told petitioner 
that the State could not prove intent because he was under the 
infiuenee—ef—intoxicating—ete^gs—at the time. However, 1 ater 
counsel suggested that petitioner plead guilty to the charges. 
d. Petitioner's counsel failed to obtain an Affidavit 
from the Petitioner's doctor, Dr. David Boorman, ttiat "was a 
prerequisite feet petitioner's plea bargains^ was hinged on. Dr. 
Boorman's affidavit was to state that he had prescribed medication 
(Zantac) to the petitioner. Dr. Boorman told petitioner that there 
2 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
would not be an adverse effect if the above medication was mixed 
with alcohol, when in fact the petitioner did experience adverse 
effects. Based upon Dr. Boorman's information and the fact that 
the petitioner did have a reaction from the medication and alcohol 
being mixed, the Prosecutor and Petitioner's attorney reached an 
agreement that petitioner would plead guilty to Second Degree 
Felony (Criminal Homicide) and be sentenced for a Third Degree 
Felony. 
d. Counsel failed to move the court for a continuance 
in order to obtain the above-mentioned affidavit, and counsel 
failed to subpoena Dr. Boorman to testify at the petitioner's court 
hearing. Therefore, the Prosecutor backed out of the plea bargain 
agreement. 
e. Counsel failed and refused to withdraw the 
petitioner's plea bargain or to postpone the matter until Dr. 
Boorman could be brought to court. 
f. Petitioner entered into the plea agreement at a time 
when he was depressed, on medication and recovering from a heart 
attack. When petitioner did realize what was happening it had been 
42 days since the petitioner entered into the plea agreement and 
petitioner was told that it was too late to withdraw his guilty 
plea. 
3 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
f. Counsel was ineffective and failed to adequately 
represent the petitioner in the best interest of the petitioner. 
4. The judgment of conviction or the commitment for 
violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal. 
Yes The number and caption or title of the appellate 
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows: 
_X_No It was not appealed because plea bargains are not 
appealable. 
Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant 
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remedy. 
5. The legality of the commitment for violation of probation 
or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been 
reviewed on appeal. Yes X No If so, the reasons for the 
denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows: 
6. Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel 
based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity. 
7. The following documents are attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply): 
Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations 
Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations, 
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations 
Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court in 
any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment 
4 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
8. Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following 
documents because (list the efforts you made to obtain the 
documents and the results of your efforts): (Jjyw/*! rr/i4&* T&2 
7 €$T^ That pursuant7 to URCP Rules 65B(b)(12) and 54(d), f 
Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain 
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevamt 
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he 
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the 
proceeding. (See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity). 
10. Due to the continuing nature of the illegal restraint, 
the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1 
does not bar this action. 
WHEREFORE# Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner 
may be present and represented by counsel. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed 
without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments. 
3. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in 
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above. 
5 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
4. Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged 
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint. 
5. (other relief 1 
Dated this /(o day of 7?24\4&& , 199 2^-. 
i <4UeLQ EDUARDC7 S. GAR! 
Attorney Pro Se 
6 
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-IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff. . (COMMITMENT) 
vs I Case No. . 
Q£ifi fi^Qsy S . *)drLL~ r. > Honorable ^s)Cuu 
, " \ 0 ( Clerk Pffifl* ^ / 
( ^rjuJP \ \ Reporter frj (l^/Kfa*-^ j Bailiff X finnAj 
Defendant. Date <?{fa?/f9( 
$ M he motion of(\ h)rdtt2* tn enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly Is D granted p(denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant teving been convicted by D a jury; O the court;^(plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of L A P ^ J L ^ Q D ^Hhn/fiMf
 t Othitlj tyhtistUt a felony 
of \hApf] AJriegree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in cou^and ready for sentence and 
represented h & fiin'tt^L and the State being represented by §?• RxfM is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; . 
* a not to exceed five years; r \ \ c - \ \ — 
\ yC of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; cX \ S \ \ v ^ ^O 
j D of not less than five years and which may be for life; l O - ^ ^ F p l - S V l * ! Ouwv 
D not to exceed years; i -fj- 0 *J 
ji and ordered to pay a fine in the amount o f S ^ n O D p*cw a.*SOO -h^M\C^c/^jU^O. ^f^csS^ 
fl^and ordered to pay restitution in thu amuuitt tyf"$= to fchi ^ A v ^ v J*+~*n
 k f ^ . 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
/(Uc£*g 
D upon motion of D State, O Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of _ pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
^Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. Xand i prisoned in accordance with this Judg e Commitment shall issue _JfSMA^ 
DATED this V-l* At 
 £ L L _ day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARZA, EDUARDO S 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HOLDEN, TAMARA 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920903255 HC 
DATE 09/03/92 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
THE PETITIONER'S PRO SE PETITION SEEKING HABEAS CORPUS 
RELIEF IS DENIED. THIS DENIAL IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE 
MATTERS RAISED COULD OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND 
WERE NOT. THE PETITIONER CLAIMS THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
AND WHILE THE COURT RECOGNIZES THAT THAT IS AN ISSUE THAT WILL 
USUALLY REQUIRE A HEARING, THE FACTUAL BASIS CLAIMED IN SUPPORT 
OF THE PETITION IS THAT COUNSEL FAILED TO SPEND ENOUGH TIME WITH 
THE PETITIONER AND FAILED TO OBTAIN A PHYSICIAN'S AFFIDAVIT AS 
TO THE AFFECT OF COMBINING ZANTAC WITH ALCOHOL. 
THE PLEA CURED THE DEFECT. THE PETITIONER WAS REPRESENTED 
BY RETAINED COUNSEL AND THE COURT CAN FIND NOTHING IN THE RECORD 
TO CAUSE THE COURT TO BELIEVE THAT THE PETITIONER'S COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE. 
THIS MINUTE ENTRY SIGNED BY THE COURT WILL CONSTITUTE THE 
ORDER OF THE COURT. 
C.C. TO MR. GARZA oJ) $4* 
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<^s 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J U D I
^ 8 1 ! [ICT 
.8W.TLAKECOUAKY ) 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No. -&$+- I'di 1''TA.i Ti ZS-
COMES NOW, Adu***^ 6*40 •? A the defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guilty) j (no contest) to the 
following crime(s): 
CRIME DEGREE 
//f/tr£ /femKiSe Z**7>t 'tf&tGf. 
7 (*-$-*>7 (?•)(*) f^ 
PUNISHMENT (Min/Max^ 
B.. 
C. 
D.. 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (^ i^nforrnat^ ioi 
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and 
elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (fguilty)_J(no 
contest). 
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> 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
fo l lows: 
LJAWQ w ^ r c /M. £ 0rthttmi/(jr /rra/* *•„, ¥ ***<i net* *~//£< l J^ 
. • 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I 
am criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the 
crime(s) charged are as follows: y^Lr T &//&{ tfexzuuir 
S— .Pi* 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. 
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I 
have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily because of the following 
reasons: /j/fi 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read 
this statement and understand the nature and elements of the 
charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea of guilty. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^ 4 ^ * If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 
is Jrfto£$ /J/A TTS / and I have had an opportunity to 
discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to 
have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I 
have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense 
to testify in court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own 
behalf but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to 
testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against 
me I need only plead Hnot guilty1' and the matter will be set 
for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be 
unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of 
Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal, those costs would be paid by the state. 
v. 
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be 
imposed upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a 
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prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to any 
fine, a ^J-? % surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 
63-63-9, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by 
the court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my 
crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I 
have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea 
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no 
contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights 
set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I 
have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the 
crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) is/is not the 
result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement 
attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
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-^ 
express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also 
not binding on the court. 
15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any 
kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no 
promises except, those contained herein and in the attached 
plea agreement, have been made to me. 
16. I have read this statement or I have had it read to 
me by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know 
that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
affidavit. I do not wish to make any changes because all of 
the statements are correct. 
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
18. I am years of age; I have attended school 
through the /cf grade and I can read and understand the 
English language• I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the 
plea(s) was made. I am not presently under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning 
mind, mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect 
or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this / / day of ^ v , 19fr3 . 
_ K _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for £*ii/ctWQ &iA£2A, 
the defendant above, and that I know /he/she has read the 
statement or that I have read it to (^ig/her and I have 
discussed it with ^iny/her and believe that he/she fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and 
lant 
CERTIFICATE QJ? PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am &i(e attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against _, defendant. I have 
reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the 
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea 
have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement 
or as supplemented on record before the court. There is 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the 
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